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Children, ages 4 and 5 years, and adults were asked (a) to explain a >IOI) charader's 
incorrect search for a desired object, and (b) to explain the source of :.he charac er-
ignorance or false belief concerning the object's true location. The character either 
(a) did not receive information about the objed's location, (bl receJVed tniorma on 
about the object's original locatron, but not about a sub>equent change oi loca ·on, 
lc) received information but searched for the object after a delay, or (d rece· -ed 
information about the object's location, but was engaged rn another actwt \-hen 
the information was presented. With increased age, there was an inc.reas.t> in e pla-
nations that referred to perceptual experience or cognitive acti\ities a lhe source oi 
the character's ignorance or false belief. By age 5 years, children shtfted be \'een 
explanations that referred to perceptual experience or to the cognttlve act 'Illes oi 
forgetting or attentional focus, depending upon the ctrcum~tances tn which t :e 
incorrect search occurred. During the late pre>chool "ears a conception o cogntuve 
actrvities as contributing to knowledge and belief becomes mt ra ed m o chtldre , 
conceptual framework for explaining human adion. 
The past decade of research on children's "theor\' oi mind· 'laS 
established that preschool children conceptualize human a , ion in me"-
talistic terms. That is, by 3 or 4 years of age, children begin to under-
stand that other people experience mental state such a_ ··no ledge. 
ignorance, beliefs, desires, intentions, and emotions; that ano• er per-
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on' mental tate ma ·differ from the child' own mental tate; and that 
mental tate influence a per on' actions. Thu , the once prevalent view 
that prior to age 7 or 8 ~ear • children relv on e ternal, ituational 
cau e· rather than internal, psychological cau e to e plain human ac-
tion is no longer tenable (Bart ch Wellman, 1989; Miller loi e. 
1989). At the arne time, re earch on ocial cognitive de\elopment ha 
hift d from an emphasi on inve. tigating children' use of general prin-
cipl of cau al rea oning, uch a the di counting principle, to an em-
phasi- on in e ligating the knowledge ba e underlving children'- cau al 
attribution (Fia,ell 1iller, 1998; 1iller Aloise, 1990). 
In particular Wellman and Bartsch {1988) propo ed that\ oung chil-
dren and adults hare a ba ic b lief-de ·ire irame\\Ork for rea oning 
about the c.:1u e of b havior. Withm children's simple belief-de-ire 
iram \\Ork, action are een to r ult from d ire and belief : D _ire 
often are n to be deri\ d from phy iological tat .., or emotion . and 
beli fs often are een to re ult irom perceptual e perience . Wellman 
(19 0) iurth r propo ed that a more elaborated under:tanding of mental 
functioning and human action d \elop later in childhood. Thi n ore 
elaborated tramework include b th a greater variet of concept· and 
n w lin · among core concepb. For e ample, in addition to realizing 
that b li f d rive from perceptual p rience, adulh al o r alize that 
cogniti\e activitie , uch a reasonmg, rememb ring, and forg tting, can 
in uen e beliei.... 
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mer & Hartl, 1 991), and even 3-year-olds use iniormation about beliei 
and desires to predict actions tWellman & Bartsch, 1988) and emotional 
reactions 1Stein & Levine, 19891. 
Although preschool children's use oi simple beliei-desire rea~ning 
has been studied extensively, subsequent elaborattons of child en' ~ e. -
planatory frameworks have been investigated \Cry little. Vellman (1990) 
proposed an elaborated framework to characterize older children's and 
adults' reasoning. Thb elaborated framework includes a concept of 
thinking that consists oi a set oi proces-es, such as reasomm!, remember-
ing, learning, and imagining, that contribute to the formation oi belief;;. 
Wellman (1990) did not specify the age at which this more elaborated 
framework might begin to appear, but he did -.u ge. t that a concep•ion 
of the mind as an active information processor rna , be-.!in around 6 
years of age (see Chandler, 1988; Pillow, 1988: and Ta;lo , 1988 tor 
similar proposals). Thus, an understanding oi cognitive proces· · i~ cen-
tral to thb more elaborated beliei-de ire framework. lntegratin con-
cepts of cognitive proces_es into an elaborated belief-de. ire framC"or · 
is an important step because it would allow children to explain ~eem­
ingly anomalous events. 
For example, con ider the following scenario. John pu' hi: lecture 
notes in hb briefca e, but a iew minutes lat r h loo · for the not on 
his desk. On the ba-:.is of his perceptual e ·perience, john hould belie\e 
that his notes are in hi') briefcase. Ther fore, hi aaion appear o con· 
flict with the belief that he should have d n ed from hts percep ual 
experience. Und rstanding that cognitive proc , a ..,eJI a percep-
tual e ·perience, contribute to behef· would allow children o he 
thi. incon.istency by mferring that John forgot that h pu hL not - '" 
the briefca·e. In th pr ent tud , we mve.tigated child n' referen<: -
to cognitive proc es, especially forgetting and I 
explain , nother per on' mi take . 
tudte of childr n' under tandtn of th t rms ·~""r>nllhi''f". 
uforget" suggest that 4- ear-old may und rst nd th am or l _e 
m ntal erbs. Although 'Nellman and johnson (1979 ·ound that 4- .ar-
old do not appreciat that both r memberin and fo tn entatl ha · 
ing had prior knowledge, but in t ad eem to thin hat "' 
refer to correct! ' iinding a hidden obj and tha .. • 
incorrect search, t vo mor rec nt tudt u that -
und rstand th k . f tur of r m m rin nd i r '• 
Fl, v II (19 4 r ported th t ,.,..h n a ked which oi \:1> char: 
hom clatmed to be ignorant of , n obj ' I 
4-rear-old ch th chara t r "ho pr 10 I h d 
location r~th r than th hard r v.h h d 
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the origins of false beliefs or ignorance by referring to perceptual experi-
ence, selective attention, or forgetting, and they should u e different 
explanatory constructs as circumstances warrant. 
In the present study, children and adults were asked to explain why 
the protagonist of a story searched for a desired object in an incorrect 
location. The circumstances leading up to the search were varied to make 
certain explanations more or less plausible in different stories. Partici-
pants could explain the protagonist's incorrect search b • referring to the 
protagonist's mental state or mental processes. At a fairlv basic level, 
these mentalistic explanations might refer to a protagonist's knO\\ ledge 
state; for example, the protagonist's ignorance or false belief concerning 
the object's true location. More elaborate mentalistic explanations would 
explain the specific source of the protagonist's ignorance or ial e belief. 
We were particularly interested in (a) children's ability to pro,•ide these 
elaborate explanations that referred to the source oi a protagonist's 
knowledge state and (b) children's ability to provide explanation that 
referred to the protagonists' perceptual experiences, such as not seeing or 
not hearing crucial information about the object's location in . ome situ-
ations, and to provide explanations that referred to the protagoni ts' cog-
nitive activities, such as forgetting the object's location or not pa 'ing 
attention to information about the object's location in other situations. 
Perceptual explanations for incorrect search are more piau ible 
when a protagonist lacked perceptual access to information concerning 
the desired object's final location. Ho\\ever, cogniti ·e e planation· are 
more plausible when information about the object'· location ' 'a- per-
ceptually available to a protagonist, but the protagom t nonetheless 
acted as if he or she were unaware oi that information. For e ·ample, 
when the protagonist had never seen where the desired object \·as 
hidden, incorrect search may be explained by referrino to the prota o-
nist's lack of perceptual access to the visual information. li ·ewi e, if a 
protagonist had been unable to hear a spoken me_:age concernin~ the 
object's location, the protagonist's lack of perceptual acces: to the meo-
sage provides an explanation for incorrect search. In contra'>!, 1f the 
protagonist previously had seen where the obje<.1 va- hidden and con-
siderable time had elapsed before the protagonist attemp ed to find it, 
then claiming that the protagonist had forgotten the object' locat1on 
provides a more plausible explanation ior incorrect .:earch than doe' 
appealing to lack of perceptual acces<.. Similar! •, if the proa oni;;t had 
been told of the object's location immediately before ·earching for it, 
but was engaged in another activity when thi verbal m e \\ ~ 
provided, failure to attend to the mess, ge \\Ould be a more plau~ible 
explanation for the protagonist's erroneous ~earch. There ore. torie..; 
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were created so that perceptual explanations were more piau ible for 
some stories and cognitive explanations were more plausible for others. 
METHOD 
Participants 
ineteen young 4-year-olds (M = 4;2, range 4;0 to 4;6---10 girls, 9 
boys 20 old four-year-olds (M = 4;9, range 4;7 to 4;11-13 girls, -
boys), and 20 five-year-olds <M = 5;4, range 5;0 to 6;0--11 girls, 9 boys 
from daycare centers in the greater Portland, Maine, area participated. 
Most children were European American and middle cia s. T\\elve col-
lege undergraduates (8 women, 4 men) also participated. 
Materials 
Several difierent dolls, a dollhouse with furniture, and a tov school 
building were used to act out brief storie . Several small container· (e.g., 
boxes, jars, toy bureaus, bowl with lids) and various small object- (e.g., 
a toy cat, toy dog, hat, gum, candy) that could be hidden in the contain-
er were used to enact hiding events in the stories. In addition, a ca sette 
tape player with a small set of headphones (made with small stereo 
earplugs) that tit the dolls' heads, and a tov "video game" (a .mall 
etch-a-sketch toy) were used as props. 
There were eight storie· in the main task and t\vo warm-up _torie-;. 
In the warm-up stories, the protagoni t doll knew \·vhere the hidden 
object wa located. In the visual access warm-up story, the doll put an 
object in one of two boxes. In the auditory acces.., warm-up torv, the 
Protagonist doll did not see where another doll put an object, but was 
told the object's location by the other doll. In both .;torie , the protago-
ni t tated th,lt he or she wanted the hidden objed and then moved 
toward the correct hiding place. \Varm-up storie.., were intendecl to fa-
rniliari.w children v-:ith the procedure by pre.,enting a simple e\ent that 
hould be eas • to comprehend, but , .. ould not te.1ch children the appro-
priate r -.ponse to the main task . tories. 
Th 'eight stories used in the m,1in task were similar to the warm-up·, 
With two kev difference : (a) the nature of the protagonists' acce:s to 
inform tion about the desired obje t'.., location' a~ varied aero ·_tori _, 
and (b) lthough the protagoni-.t tated a d sire ior the objed, he or . he 
th n earched for it in the wrong lo .ation. Ther • vere four perceptual 
tori anci iour ( ogniti a " stori . In two of the perceptual 
the protagoni t did not the d ... ired object'- location 
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(visual stories) and in the other two perceptual access stories the pro-
tagonist could not hear a spoken message about the object's location 
(auditory stories). In addition, in one visual story and one auditol) story, 
the desired object was placed in a container where it remained through-
out the story (single location). In one visual story and one auditOI)' story, 
the object initially was placed in one container and later moved to 
another location (change of location). Single-location and change-of-lo-
cation stories were included to create two different visual stories and 
two different auditory stories. However, the desired object's location 
was not a variable of interest and was not included in the analvses 
reported later. In brief (see the Appendix for full stories), in the 'isual 
stories, the protagonist was at school when another character either (a) 
placed the desired object in a container at home or (b) mO\ed the object 
to a new location. In either case, the protagonist did not see the desired 
object's final location. In the auditory stories, the character who either 
(a) hid the desired object or (b) moved the object to a new location, 
verbally described its location, but because the protagonist was listening 
to loud music with headphones covering her ears, she could not hear 
what the other character said (nor could she see the object being hid-
den, because her back was turned to the containers). 
In the cognitive access stories, information about the desired ob-
ject's location was perceptually available to the protagonist, but the 
protagonist acted as if he or she was unaware of that information. In two 
of the cognitive access stories the protagonist was engaged in an atten-
tion-demanding activity (i.e., playing a silent video game) vhen informa-
tion about the desired object's location was presented auditorially 
(attentional focus stories) and in two cognitive access storie the protago-
nist saw the object's location, but searched in the wrong location follow-
ing a delay (delayed search stories). In addition, in one attentional focus 
story and one delayed search story, the desired object remained in a 
single container throughout the story (single location), and in one atten-
tional focus story and one delayed search story, the object ,·a placed in 
one container and then moved to another location (change of location). 
In the attentional focus stories, the character who either (a) hid the 
desired object or (b) moved the object to a new location 'erba. ) de-
scribed the object's location, but the protagonist vas pla •ing a · ent 
video game, rather than paying attention to what the other characer sard 
(and the protagonist could not see the object being hidden becau~ 1-Jer 
back was turned). Thus, in the attentional focus stories the 'erbal mes-
sage about the object's location was physically audible but not attended. 
In the delayed search stories, the protagonist her elf either (a) hid the 
desired object in the morning or (b) hid the object and then mo ed it to 
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a new location. Then after spending the day at school, the protagonist 
returned and looked for the object in the incorrect location, as if he or 
she had forgotten where it had last been seen. 
Procedure 
Each participant was tested individually in a single 20-min session bv 
two experimenters. The two warm-up stories preceded the eight stories 
comprising the main task. The warm-up stories were presented in coun-
terbalanced order across participants and the eight stories in the main 
task were presented in random order. Each story was acted out using the 
house and/or the school, one or two dolls, two containers serving as 
potential hiding places, and an object to be hidden. During each story, 
participants watched the object being hidden in one of the t:\'\'0 contain-
ers. Thus, participants always knew the hidden object's location. 
At the end of each story, the protagonist stated a desire for the 
hidden object and then moved toward the correct hiding place in the 
warm-up stories or the incorrect hiding place in the main-task stories. 
Just as the protagonist was about to open the container, the stof) 
stopped and participants were asked a sequence of questions: 
1. The behavior explanation question asked participants to explain 
why the protagonist looked for the hidden object in a particular location 
(e.g., "Why did Tom look for the cat behind the black door?"). 
2. The belief question assessed participants' ability to judge the 
Protagonist's belief about the desired object's location (e.g., "\\'here 
does Tom think the cat is?"). For the warm-up stories the protagonist 
appeared to hold a true belief about the object's location, but for the 
eight main-task stories the protagonist appeared to hold a false belief. 
3. The beliei explanation question asked participanb to explain the 
source of the belief that they had attributed to the protagonist (e.g., 
either "Why does Tom think the cat is behind the red door?" or "\Vhy 
does Tom think the cat is behind the black door?", depending on the 
belief the participant previously attributed to the doll). 
4. The reality question assessed participants' knowledge of the de-
sired object's true location (e.g., "Where is the cat really?"). For the t\\·o 
Warm-up stories .. the procedure ended here. In the main task, the proce-
dure continued. 
5. For the tv.·o auditOr)' stories and the two attentional focus stories, 
the verbalization question a se sed participants' memory oi the second 
story character's remark about the hidden object's location (e.g., "\\'hat 
did Sarah sav to Tom?"). 
6. For each of the eight main-task stories, participants \\ere asked a 
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false belief explanation question. For the two visual stories and the two 
delayed search stories, participants were asked why the protagonist did 
not think the desired object was in its true location {e.g., .,Ho' come 
Cathy doesn't think the gum is in the red drav.·er?"). Likewise, for the 
two auditory and the two attentional focus stories, participants 'ere 
asked to explain why the protagonist did not think the desired ob:ect 
was in the true location even though the other character had said it \\as 
there (e.g., "If Sarah said it was behind the red door, ho ,. come :on' 
doesn't think the cat is behind the red door?"). 
Participants were never informed about the accurac: oi their re-
sponses, nor were the contents of either container e er re\ealed. For 
eight stories in the main task, the belief question. the realit: question, 
and the verbalization question were used as controls to screen partici-
pants who failed to understand or remember the stories accurately. n ' 
participant who answered one or more of these control questions incor-
rectly for three or more stories was excluded from the anal~ es. ·ing 
this criterion, two young 4-year-olds and two old 4- ear-olds \ere e -
eluded from the analyses reported later. In the remaining ample, all 12 
adults, 17 5-year-olds, 17 old 4-year-olds, and 13 •oun -1-.~ar-olds 
answered the control questions correctly for all 8 stories; 3 5-. ear-ofd.::, 
1 old 4-year-old, and 3 young 4-year-olds answered correct!; for 7 
stories, and 1 young 4-year-old answered correct! • ior 6 tories. 
RESULTS 
Coding 
Participants' response~ were coded both a. spontaneou explan ion; 
and as complete prompted e planations. Spontaneou_ , planatso .. -ere 
answers given to the behav1or explanation question, vhich 1\ ~ the fi st 
que~tion a ked after each story. Complete prompted eJ plana so ~ 
compo ites including an·wers given to the behavior e. planatson, belief 
e. planation, and false belief e plane lion quest1ons folio 'in each .to ' 
Three basic response categorie~ \\ere u. ed to cod both _pontane· 
ous and complete prompted e planation-, ior the ''arm-up and main I ;; 
stories: knowledge state e planation , per eptual urce e. p anati0°' 
and cognitive source explan<llions. Knowleci~e _tat • e p anation: con· 
sisted of references to (a) th protagonist' ignorance r rdin the de-
sired object's location or the \erbal information pro ided b) other 
character or ~b the protagonbt':. fal belief con ob'e<:t', 
location {e.g., " he do n't know that it' in th b th10·' 
it' in there, but it'- not"). Per eptual source 
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ences to perceptual sources of the protagonist's ignorance or false belief 
and thus included (a) references to the fact that the protagonist had seen 
or heard about the object's location or had placed the object in its 
hiding place, (b) suggestions that the hidden object usually was kept in 
the location where the protagonist was searching for it, or (c) mention of 
the fact that the protagonist had not seen or heard about the object's 
location (or change of location) or was absent when the object was 
hidden or moved (e.g., "Because he saw it in the blue jar, but Susan put 
it in the black jar," "That's \\here he usually keeps it," "He didnt hear 
her with the things on his ears"). Cogniti\ e source explanations were 
references to cognitive factors contnbuting to the protagonist's ignorance 
or false belief. Cognitive source explanations included (a) forgetting ex-
planations: suggestions that the protagonist had forgotten the hidden 
object's location (e.g., "She forgot that it was in the blue one"), or (b) 
focus of activity explanations: suggestions that the protagonist was en-
gaged in or attending to some other activity \vhen iniormation about the 
hidden object's location was available (e.g., "He didn't hear her sa~ it 
was in the red box because he was too busy playing a game," • Because 
he didn't think because he wa playing the video game"). 
In addition to three basic response categories, rea/it\' responses 
mentioned the hidden object's true location, desire responses stated the 
Protagonist's desire ior the hidden object, and not there responses men-
tioned that the object wa~ not 1n the lo ation where the protagonist had 
searched. All other responses were coded as "other," udon't know," or 
"no response" and were not included in the iollowmg analy~e-;. PartJc.i-
Panh could give more than one category oi re~ponse for each storv. For 
example, a participant might refer both to the protagoni'lt's ignorance 
(knowledge state) and to the protagoni t's forgetting (cognitive ..:ource). 
The second author coded all respon.,e ·. A a reliabilit , check, an inde-
Pendent judge who was blind to the purpo-,e of the ~tudy coded all 
responses to all eight stori for five participants 111 each age group 
(Cohen's 1\ = .86 for both .;pontaneou and .omplete prompted e.·plana-
tJon . Di agreement) \\ere re-.olved by di-.cus-.•on . 
Scoring 
pontan ous e planations were .., ored {or eac.h oi the eight .~tories 
by giving each parti ~ ipant a "wre of 0 or 1 for each r -.pon e c.ategory. 
lhat i , if a parti ipant gave a knowledge .;tate explanation m re-:ponc:e 
to th beha 10r e ·planation que .. tion for a particular story, the parted-
Pant receh I a knowled tate s or of 1 for that _tory. Oth rwi e, the 
Partiupant' knO\ ledg <>tat ~ or for that tory va 0. likewi e, par-
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Table 1. Mean Number (and Standard Deviation) of Spontaneou Explanations 



















4-year-olds 4-year-olds 5-year-olds 
n = 1 7 n = 7 8 n = 20 
Knowledge state explanations 
Adults 
n = 12 
1.00 (1 .32) 0.72 (1.07) 0.95 (0.94) 1.17 10.84) 
1.29 (1 .31) 1.06 (1.26) 0.55 (0.83) 0.-!2 (0.67) 
Perceptual source e\planations 
0.88 (1.27) 1.56 (1.34) 2.00 (1.17) 2.83 (0.84) 
0.47(0.94) 1.00(1.14 1.60(1.14) 1.83(0.58) 
Cognitive source e;;.p/anations 
0.18 (0.53) 0.11 (0.47) 0.45 (0.76) 0 17 (0 39) 
0.18 (0.39) 0.72 (0.90) 1.50 (1.61) 2.08 (0.79) 
Reality e;;.planations 
0.47 (0.87) 0.11 (0.32) 0.15 (0.37) 0.00 (0.()()) 
0.35 (0.49) 0.28 (0.75) 0.05 (0.22) 0 00 (0.()()) 
Desire explanations 
0.18 (0.53) 0.18 (0.53) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 
0.24 (0.66) 0.12 (0.48) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 
" ot there"' re~pon).(?S 
0.64 (1.11) 0.44 (1.15) 0.10 (0.31) 0.00 (0.00) 
0.41 (1.00) 0.50 (1.15) 0.10 (0.31) 0.00 (0.00) 
Other responses 
0.47 (1.01) 0.39 (0.70) 0.30 (0.73) 0.28 (0.77) 
0.41 (0.71) 0.17(0.51) 0.20 {0.93) 0.01 (0.32) 
No respon:-e 
0.29 (0.77) 0.50 (0.79) 0.45 (1.05) 
0.47 (1.07) 0.39 (0.70) 0.50 (0.89) 
Note. The number po~5ible per cell is 4. 
ticipants received perceptual source and cogniti~e ource _cor o· 0 or 
l for each story. The scores for each oi the four ·torie \ i hin th h o 
informational access conditions (perceptual acce _ and c<Y.!ni i e acce ., 
stories) were ummed. Thus, participants' kno \~ed _ a e pJan ion 
cores for each of the I\\O conditions ranged from 0 to , depeodin on 
whether thev gave a knowledge state e. planation in r pon· o 0, 1, _, 
3. or 4 of torie in each condition. or for plan ron 
categories \.\ere calculat d in a similar manner. or ed h 
explanation cate ory are pre.:. nted in Table 1. 
Children's Cognitive Explanations 
Table 2. Mean umber (and Standard Deviation) 
of Complete Prompted Explanations for Each Category 
by Age and Informational Access 
Young Old 
4-vear-olds 4-rear-olds 5-vear-o/d 
Informational access n = 17 n = 18 n =20 
Knowledge state explanations 
Perceptual stories 1 .59 (1 .46) 0.83 (1 .04) 1 .25 (.97) 
Cognitive stories 1.65 (1 .41) 1.17(1.15) 0.75 (0.91) 
Perceptual source e\planation 
Perceptual stories 1.71 (1.61) 2.50 (1.46) 3.15 (1 .27) 
Cognitive stories 1.35 (1.32) 1.78 (1.17) 2.05 (1.15) 
Cogniti1 e source explanations 
Perceptual stories 0.53 (0.87) 0.44 (0.86) 1.10(1.16) 
Cogniti\e stories 1.00 (1.46) 1.56(1.15) 2.80 (1.36) 
Reality explanations 
Perceptual stories 0.59 (1 .12) 0.17 (0.38) 0.30 (0.47) 
Cognitive stories 0.53 (0.87) 0.28 (0.75) 0.05 (0.22) 
De 1re e\planation . ., 
Perceptual stories 0.65 (1.32) 0.22 (0.73) 0.10(0.311 
Cognitive stories 0.47 (1.07) 0.67 (0.91) 0.00 (0.00) 
, 
ot there"' re:;ponc.es 
Perceptual tories 0.64(1.11) 0.50 (1 20) 0.15 (0.37) 
Cogniti\e stories 0.41 (1.00) 0.50(1.15) 0.10 (0 31) 
Other re~pon. e~ 
Perceptual storie 1.12 (1.27) 1.06 (1.47) 0.45 (0.76) 
Cognitive <;tories 0.82 (1.01) 1 67 (0.91) 0.35 {0.931 
No re.pon•e 
0.18 (0.53) 0.22 (0.43) 0.25 (0.91) 
0.17 (0.38) 0.05 (0.22) 
1.1ndard d \ 1ation~ ar m parenthe 
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Adults 







0 00 (0.00) 
0.00 (0.00) 
0 08 (0.24) 
0.00 (0.00) 
0 00 (0.00) 
0.00 (0.00) 
0.28 (0./7) 
0 17 (0.40) 
0.00 (0.00) 
Complete prompted e planations ''ere scored ior each of the ei ht 
stories b • giving each participant a core oi 1 ior a particular e plana-
tion cat gor • if the participant gave that t •p of explanation m re;;pon-e 
to either the b havior planation question, the beli i e planation qu~-
lion, or the ial belief e. ·planation qu tion. 1ean cor _ for each 
c tegory are pr nted in Tabl 2. 
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RESULTS 
Overview of Analyses 
The primary goal of the present study was to examine '' hether chil-
dren make appropriate use of explanations that referred to the protago-
nists' perceptual experiences and explanations that reierred to the 
protagonists' cognitive activities. Knowledge state explanations are appro-
priate for both perceptual access and cognitive access stories. HO\\ ever, 
perceptual source explanations would be more plausible ior the percep-
tual access stories, but cognitive source explanations would be more 
plausible for the cognitive access stories. Therefore, Age (young .f 's. o1d 
4 vs. 5 vs. adult) x Informational access (perceptual access vs. cogn tr\e 
access stories) x Explanation category (knowledge state ' . perceptual 
source vs. cognitive source), ANOVAs (with informational acces and 
explanation category as a within-subjects variables) were performed 
separately for the spontaneous and complete prompted explanations. 
Because each A OVA revealed a significant Age x Informational 
access x Explanation category interaction (spontaneous explanations, F 
(6, 126) = 6.01, p < .001, MSE = 0.60; complete prompted e planations, 
F (6, 126) = 5.95, p < .001, MSE = 0.80), for each of the basic e. plana-
tion categories, an Age x Informational access A, OVA wa performed 
separately for spontaneous and complete prompted e planatron.:. 
To fully examine participants' ability to use cognitive iactor to 
explain a protagonist's incorrect search, cogniti\e ource e planations 
were iurther subdivided into two more speciiic categorie-, for-etting 
explanations and focus of activity explanations. For eac1 0' these two 
more specific response categories, we performed Age x t ' • type (de-
layed search vs. attentional focus) A, OVAs (with sto t\ ..,e - a . •ithin-
subject variable) for both spontaneous and complete prompte< 
explanations. These analyses allowed us to im e ti ate the e ent to 
which participants (a) used forgetting to e plain erroneous ~earches rn 
the delayed search stories but not the attentional iocus torie:, and (b) 
used focus of activity to explain erroneous searche. in the atten ional 
focus stories but not the delayed search stories. 
KnowledBe state explanations. For spontaneous e planation~, an 
Age x Informational access (4 x 2) A, OVA periormed on the 'nod-
edge state explanation scores did not yield significant main e·-ecb o a .... e 
or informational acce s, but there was a significant Age lnionna ional 
access interaction, F (3, 63) = 3.26, p < .05, 15f = 0.60. 'nO\\Ied~e 
state explanations tended to decrease with age for cogniti\ acces-
ries, but not ior perceptual access stories. 1ore speo Jcall ', 
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year-olds gave significantly more knowledge state explanations ior cog-
nitive access stories than did adults, Tukey H50 = 0.86, p < .05. The 
pattern of results was similar for complete prompted explanations. 
For complete prompted kno\1\ ledge state explanations, an Age x 
Informational access (4 x 2) A OVA did not yield significant main ef-
fects of age or informational access; however, the Age x Informational 
access interaction was significant, F (3,63) = 2.79, p <.OS. A.15E = 0.85. 
There were no significant age differences for the perceptual access sto-
ries. For cognitive access stories, young 4-year-olds ga\e signiiicantlv 
more knowledge state explanations than did adults, Tuke)- H50 = 1.02, 
P< .05. 
Perceptual source explanations. An Age x Informational access 4 x 
2) A OVA performed on the spontaneous perceptual source explana-
tion scores yielded significant main effects of age, F (3, 63) = 1.02, p < 
.001. A-15£ = 2.07, and informational access, F (1, 63) = 2-L16, p < .001, 
M5E = 0.42. Young 4-year-olds gave significantly fewer perceptual 
source explanations than did 5-year-olds or adults. Tukey H50 = 0.95, p 
< .05. In addition, perceptual source explanations were used more often 
for the perceptual access stories than ior the cogniti\ e access stories. 
For the complete prompted explanations, an Age x Informational 
access (4 x 2) A OVA performed on perceptual source expianations 
yielded significant effects of age, F (3, 63) = 4.14, p < .01 \1 E = 2.42, 
and informational access. F (1, 63) = 41.18, p < .001, \I E = i\65. 
However, these effects were qualified b~ an Age x lniormat1onat acces. 
interaction, F (3 ,63) = 3.08, p < .05, M5E = 0.65. Fi\e-year-olds and 
adult gave significantly more perceptual source explanations for per-
ceptual access stories than for cognitive storie , but -l-year-olds' expla-
nation did not vary by story type, Tukey HSO = 0.89, p < .05. 
Cogniti1 e source eAplanations. For spontaneous explanations. an 
Age x Informational acce s (4 x 2) A OVA performed on the cognitive 
source explanation -;core yielded ignificant main efiects of age, F (3, 
63) = 6.14, p < .001 \15£ = 1.1 0, and informational acce_ s, F (1, 63) = 
45.67, p < .001, A.15E = 0.46, and a -;igniiicant Age x Informational 
access interact1on, F ,3,63) = 9.89, p < .001, ,\1 E = 0.46. For perceptual 
acce-,s stories there were no signiiicant age difierence-.. Fhe-vear-old~ 
and c dults gave cognitive source explanations significantly more oiten 
for cognitive access stories than for perceptual acce:.s stories, Tu ev 
H. 0 = 0.75, but 4-year-olcJ..' explanation" did not vary ior the l\\O type 
of _torie .... 
similar patt rn of re-;uft _ v~.a-. tound for complete prompted e pla-
nation~. n t\ge Informational acce-..; (4 x 2) At-.:OVA performed on 
compl tt:> prompted co >nitive .ource e. -planation .core: •i lded ..igniii-
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cant effects of age, F (3, 63) = 7.43, p < .001, MSE = 1.92 and lnrorma-
tional access, F (1, 63) = 111.76, p < .001, MSE = 0.56, and a significant 
Age x Informational access interaction, F (3, 63) = 9.57, p < .001, \15£ = 
0.56. As was the case for spontaneous explanations. among 5-~ ear-o!ds 
and adults cognitive source explanations were significantly more com-
mon for cognitive access stories than for perceptual access stories. How-
ever, for complete prompted explanations, unlike spontaneous explana-
tions, old 4-year-olds also gave significantly more cognitive .ource 
explanations for cognitive access stories, Tukey HSD = 0.83, p < .05. 
In summary, examination of knowledge state explanations indicated 
that explanations referring to the protagonist's ignorance or false belief 
decreased with age for the cognitive access stories. By 5 ears of age, 
children's performance was very similar to adults' performance. Examina-
tion of perceptual source explanations indicated that when the protago-
nist did not receive perceptual information about the de·ired object's 
location (perceptual access stories), 5-year-olds and adults usually e:'\.-
plained the protagonist's incorrect search in terms oi the presence or 
absence of perceptual experience. In contrast, when the protagonist 
searched incorrectly despite having been exposed to information about 
the object's location (cognitive stories), references to perceptual experi-
ence were less frequent and did not increase with age. Thu:, vi<h in-
creased age, the use of perceptual source explanation· became more 
differentiated. Examination of cognitive source e planations indicated 
that references to cognitive factors such as forgetting or focu- of acti,·itv 
increased with age and were used specifically to explain vh}' the pro-
tagonist searched incorrectly despite having been expo.ed to mformation 
about the desired object's location. Thus, cognitive .:ource e planations 
were used frequently by 5-year-olds and adults in re.5pon.: to cogniU\e 
stories, but were rarely given in response to perceptual _tories b an; a e 
group. 
Forgetting and focus of activit}'. Response · for cognithe acce5.:: sto-
ries \\ere examined in more detail by comparing the u.:e of forgetting 
and focus oi activity explanations for delayed search and attent•onal 
focus stories. Forgetting e. ·planations were sugg ·tion~ hat l e prota o-
nist had forgotten the hidden object's location. Focu. of act1 ·it, e plan.t-
tions mentioned that the protagonist wa engaged m or attendin to 
some other activity when information about ,the hidden ob"ect' locat1on 
was a ailable. Separate analvses were performed for pon aneou- and 
complete prompted e planation~. 
To examine the use oi spontaneous forgetting e plana i 
pant: were given a score ranging from 0 to 2 for th o dela 
storie .. and a 5core ranging irom 0 to ::! for th l\\0 a 
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Table 3. Mean umber (and Standard Deviation) 
of Complete Prompted Forgetting and Focus of Activity Explanation 
by Age and Story Type 
Young Old 
393 
4-rear-olds 4-year-olds 5-year-old 
Informational access n = 1 7 n - 1 8 n = 20 
Adults 
n = 12 
Spontaneous forgetting explanations 
Delayed search stories 0.12 (0.33) 0.61 (0.78) 0.75 (0.91) 1 .33 0.65) 
Attentional focus stories 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.20 (0.52) 0.00 (0.001 
Complete prompted forgetting explanation~ 
Delayed earch stories 0.47 (0.80) 0.89 (0.90! 1.30 (0.86) 1.83 (0.39) 
Attentional focus stories 0.18 (0.53) 0.06 (0.24) 0.30 10.73) 0.08 (0.29) 
Spontaneou.~ focus of acti\·itv explanations 
Delayed search stories 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00! 0.00 (0.00> 
Attentional focus stories 0.06 (0.24) 0.06 (0.24) 0.55 (0.69) 0.67 !0.49) 
Complete prompted focus of activit\· explanations 
Delayed earch stories 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.05 (.22) 0.00 (0.00) 
Attentional iocus tories 0.41 (0.80) 0.61 (0.78) 1.25 (0.91 l 1.42 (0.67) 
.\'ote The number po~sible per cell b 2. Standard deviation~ are in parenthe e-.. 
Storie . Table 3 shows the mean number oi forgetting explanations for the 
1:\vo type of storie . An Age x Story tvpe A 10VA yielded igniiicant 
effects of age, F (3, 63) = 5 SO p < .005, MSE = 0.36, and :.lory twe, F 
(1 ,63} = 50.73, p < .001, 1 E = 0.24. Hm.vever, these efiect were 
qualified by an ge x tory type interaction, F (3, 63) = 7.41, p < .001, 
,\.1 E = 0.24. Old 4-~ear-olds, 5-year-olds, and adults ga' e forgetting ex-
planation-; igniiicantl~· more often in re~ponse to del a\ ed -earch .tories 
than in respon. to attentional iocu., -;torie~, Tukey H D = 0.54, p < .05. 
similar pattern oi re.,ults wa found tor complete prompted forget-
ting e planation·. n ge torv tyl) (4 x 2) , OV :ielded _ ignifi-
cant effe t.; oi age, F (3, 63) = 4 2 p < .01, M E = 0.61, and ~tory t pe, 
F(l, 63) = 9G.44, p < .001, \1 [ = 0.29. HO\\E'\er, th. efrec~ \\ere 
qualified b an ge x tory typ mteraction. F (3, 63) = 8.79, p < .001, 
,\JSE == 0.- . Older 4-year-old~, 5-year-old~, and aduiL u_ed forgettino 
e. planation· sign iii antly mor ofttn for del a\~ sec rch _tori than for 
attentional iocu" o;;tories. Tuke • H 0 = O.St, p < .05. 
lik '' i , to a min th u ... c of fo u of activity e planation_, for 
both ~pontan u l)lanation and ompl t prompted e planation_, 
Parti ip nt \\ re gi,en < ~cor ranging from 0 to 2 ior the t '0 d Ia ed 
_ arch tori nd a ., ore ran ing from 0 to _ for th l\ o attentional 
10 u tori . T bl ho th rn an num r of f u of a tivit ' e pia-
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nations for the two types of stories. For spontaneous explanation-, an 
Age x Story type (4 x 2) A OVA yielded significant effects oi age, F (3, 
63) = 7.64, p < .01, MSE = 1.11, and story type, f(1, 63 = 30.71, p < 
.001, MSE = 0.11. However, these effects were quai if:ed b\ an ge x 
Story type interaction, F (3, 63) = 7 .64, p < .005, 'v1SE = 1.11. Fi\ e-\ ear-
aids and adults gave significantly more focus of acti\ in exp:a11atlons for 
attentional focus stories than they did for delayed search stories. Tu ey 
HSO = 0.36, p < .05. A similar pattern of results was found ior cofllplete 
prompted explanations. An Age x Story type (4 x 2~ A:-\OVA periormed 
on complete prompted focus of activity explanations yielded igniiicant 
effects of age, F (3, 63) = 6.35, p < .01, MSE = 0.31, and storv type, F (1, 
63) = 73.54, p < .001, MSE = 0.35. Howe"er, these effect \\ere qua -
fied by an Age x Story type interaction, F (3, 63~ = -L97, p < .005, \' E = 
0.35. Five-year-olds and adults used focus of activit\• e. ·planatk·'l · g-
nificantly more often for the attentional focus stories than for the delaved 
search stories, Tukey HSO = 0.66, p < .05. 
In summary, the use of forgetting to explain incorrect search in-
creased with age. Older 4-year-olds, 5-year-olds, and adults u:ed for et-
ting explanations specifically to explain errors when the protagonist had 
been exposed to information about the object's location, but -earched 
following a delay. In contrast, if the protagonist had been en aged in 
another attention-demanding activity at the time information about the 
desired object's location was provided, 5-year-olds and adul irequently 
referred to focus of activity to explain the protagonist' ancorrect search, 
but they did not use focus of activity explanations otherwise. 
DISCUSSION 
The present results indicate that some elaboration_ o- the ~imple 
belief-desire framework begin to emerge durino the late pr _ hool ears. 
The young 4-year-olds often provided some t pe of mentaiLt•c e. plana-
tion for the protagonist's incorrect search. That is. more than half o· their 
explanations consisted of reierences to the protagoni.::t'.:: ignorance, fal5e 
belief, lack oi perceptual experience, or desire for the hidden object. 
Like\-vise, older 4-year-olds' explanations frequent! • referred o the pro-
tagoni t' knO\.vledge state (i.e., ignorance or false belief). Th - ul 
are in keeping with the results reported b · Bartsch and tellman 1 89, 
and demonstrate use of the simple belie -de::,ire fram o . B 5 }ear. 
of age, children often referred to the perceptual or cogni i -ource of 
the protagonist's knowled e state. Moreo er, 5- ·ear-old_ de on rated 
fie. ibility in their rea_oning. That is, the . ga\e peroep ual o cogni i e 
. ource e planations dep nding upon the details of the -•tuat1on m 'hich 
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a mistaken action occurred. When the protagonist did not receive per-
ceptual information about the desired object's location, both 5-vear-olds 
and adults explained the protagonist's incorrect search by referring to 
protagonist's perceptual experience. In contrast, \\hen the protagon 1st 
had been presented with perceptual information about the desired ob-
ject's location, but nevertheless searched incorrectly, both 5-year-olds 
and adults referred to cognitive factors, such as forgetting or focus of 
activity, to explain the protagonist's mistake. Furthermore, children and 
adults used different types of cognitive explanations in different circum-
stances. When the protagonist searched following a delay, older 4-}ear-
olds, 5-year-olds, and adults explained errors by saving that the 
protagonist had forgotten the destred object's location. Hm\ever, ii the 
protagonist had been engaged in an attention-demanding activitv at the 
time information about the desired object's location was provided, 5-
year-olds and adults frequently suggested that the protagonist had not 
been paying attention or had been engaged in some other activity when 
the information was provided. 
Wellman's (1990) distinction bef\.veen young children's simple be-
lief-desire scheme for understanding human action and a later-develop-
ing, more elaborated explanatory framevvork is useful for interpreting the 
results of the pre ent study. Within the more elaborated framewor ·, a 
greater variety of mental states and processe· are differentiated and an 
increased number oi causal connections among these concept_- are rep-
resented. According to Wellman {1990), \\ ithin the simple belief-de~ ire 
framework, perceptions cause beliefs, but within the elaborated frame-
work, cognitive activities, such as reasoning, imagining. and remember-
ing, also may influence beliefs. Children's references to forgetting or 
attention to e. plain mistaken actions and false beliefs sugge·ts that some 
conception of cognitive activities begins to emerge bv -t 1h or 5 •ear of 
age. Moreo\·er, 5-year-olds' differential use oi forgetting and attention 
expl,mation~ ugge ts that they ha\ e begun to appreciate that each proc-
e s relates to perception and beltei different! •: Attending selectively ma ' 
result in a failure to encode perceptuall ' available information, but for-
getting may re..,ult in the los~ of information that was encoded pre-
viously. Thus, 5-year-old.;' early wncepts oi cognitive acti\'itie. -uch a-:; 
attention and iorgetting appear to be coordinated with concepts of per-
ception, knowledge, belief, and action. However, children'-. awarene-.s 
of the phenomena oi iorgetting and attendmg doe · not nec.e .sarilv indi-
cate that th v conceive of th mimi itself a~ an entit ' that acti el • 
interprets information. 
E: tim.:lt oi the age at which children begin to conceive of th mind 
a an activ .gent varY widel • in th literature. Perner and Davie- (1991) 
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claimed that 4-year-olds have such a conception, but Chandler 1988), 
Pillow (1988), and Taylor (1988) all proposed that before 6 or - years of 
age children regard knowledge acquisition as a passive process. In addi-
tion, although Wellman and Hickling (1994) suggested that children be-
gin to conceive of the mind as an active agent around 8 to 10 years of 
age, Schwanenflugel, Fabricius, and Alexander (1994) argued that a con-
structivist conception of the mind develops sometime after 10 vears of 
age. In the present study, conceptions of forgetting and attention began to 
emerge around 4 1/2 or 5 years of age. Thus, to organize the present 
findings and previous results into a coherent developmental sequence, it 
is necessary to examine these discrepant claims. These discrepant vie\\S 
of development can be reconciled by considering the different criteria 
that have been used to determine when children can be credited with an 
understanding of the mind as actively processing information. 
Perner and Davies (1991) suggested that understanding of the mind 
as an active interpreter of information is achieved when a child recog-
nizes that a listener may evaluate the credibility of a message b · compar-
ing it with the listener's existing knowledge. In their stud , 4-vear-olds 
correctly predicted, for example, that Mary would believe Peter's asser-
tion that a plastic brick was real if she had not touched ·r. Ho '€\ er, if 
Mary had touched the brick and discovered it was fake, 4- ear-old 
predicted that Mary would reject Peter's assertion as incorrect. Thu_, 
4-year-olds understood that information may be accepted a· true or re-
jected as false, depending on whether it matches a person's pre ·iou_ly 
held knowledge. In the present study, 4-year-olds' references to forgetting 
indicate that 4-year-olds know that information may be retained or lost, 
and 5-year-olds' references to attention indicate that 5-. ear-old ·now 
that information may be attended to or 1gnored. Therefore, around ... to 5 
years of age, children appreciate that mental activities influence the ac-
quisition and retention of knowledge by selecting .vhat iniormation L 
encoded or represented. 
Chandler (1988), Pillow (1988), and Taylor (1988) all propo.ed that 
children do not have an active conception of the mind until 6 or I :ear· 
of age. These researchers used children's under.tandino that prior 
knowledge can be used to make inferences that go beyond immediatelv 
perceptible information as the criterion for crediting child en \'lth a 
conception of the mind as an active interpreter. That i . children een u-
ally realize that mental activities not only influence what information 1;; 
repre ented, but also influence how that information L repre en ed Pil-
low, 1995). For example, Pillow (1991) reported tha 6- ar-o d_, unli ·e 
4-year-olds, appreciated that an observ r's e pectation: abou ano her 
person might iniluence how the observer interpreL that per on•- action~-
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Six-year-olds recognized that an observer who witnessed another person 
holding a toy in ambiguous circumstances might interpret that person's 
action as taking the toy or giving the toy, depending upon whether the 
observer was biased to expect the other person to behave in an antiso-
cial or prosocial manner. 
Although 6-year-olds are becoming aware of activities that create a 
representation that goes beyond the information directly available, later 
in childhood, conceptions of cognitive activities become increasingly 
abstract. Thus, Wellman and Hickling (1994) distinguished between 
knowing about mental activity and conceptualizing an independent ac-
tive mind. They proposed that children regard beliefs as actively con-
structed through inference and interpretation before children conceive oi 
the mind itself as an independent, active entity. In support of this view, 
Wellman and Hickling (1994) reported that although 6-year-olds gener-
ally understood metaphors that personify natural or mechanical phenom-
ena (e.g., "The \.vind was hO\.\'Iing"), 6-year-olds typically did not under-
stand metaphors that personify the mind as an active agent 'e.g., " Her 
rnind was racing"). Eight- and 1 0-year-olds usually understood personi-
fied metaphors for the mind, and many 1 0-year-olds also produced them. 
Likewise, Schwanenflugel et al. (1994) argued that although 8- and 
1 0-year-olds may possess some knowledge of mental activities, the _ 
have not yet organized their knowledge of mental phenomena into a 
constructivist conception of the mind. When asked to rate the Similarity 
of various selective attention, recognition , and comprehension activities. 
8- and 1 0-year-olds did not organize the activities into three di ·tinct 
clusters. Schwanenflugel et al. (1994) suggested that children failed to 
distinguish among these activities because children iocused on the in-
Puts and outcome" oi each task rather than the cognitive activities inter-
vening between inputs and outputs. In contra_ t, Sch\\anenilugel et al. 
(~ 994) found that adult.; distinguished among a variety of mental acth·i-
hes and organized their knowledge of the mind in terms of similaritie: 
and differences among cognitive activities. Thus, Schwanenflugel et al. 
(1994) conclude<i that knowledge of the organization of cognithe acti •i-
ties de\ elop ... sometime betwe n 10 ~ears of age and adulthood. The 
results reported by Wellman and Hickling (1l94) and chwanenilugel et 
al. 09'4) trace the development of increa~ingly ab tract conception~ of 
~ental activity. By 8 to 10 , ears oi age, children '.; knowledge of cogni-
tive activitie.-; may be organized into a conception oi the mind a~ an 
aaive agent, c1nd b , adulthood a conception oi relationship among 
c1istin t mental clCtiviti s mav emerge. 
Th und r tanding of cognithe activitie.-; evident m 4-lf.? and 5- •ear-
old ' e ·planations of another per_on' mJ.stake-. in the pr -ent ~ tud may 
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·provide an early foundation for the more abstract conceptions of mental 
activity that de\'elop later. For example, children's av:areness of di tinc-
tions among cognitive processes appears to increase gradually during 
middle and late childhood. Thus. 6- and 7-vear-olds make ~me distinc-
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Appendix 
\Varm-up stories 
Visual: Here's Sally. She has some crayons. Sally puts her crayons in 
the red box. Then Bill comes over. Bill says, "Sally, let's color." Sally 
wants the crayons. Sally looks for the crayons in the red box. 
Auditory: Here's Sam. Sam has a picture. Sam puts the picture in the 
blue box. Here comes Emily. Sam says, "Emily, the picture is in the blue 
box." Emily wants to see the picture. Emily looks for the picture in the 
blue box. 
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Perceptual access stories 
Visual, single location: Here's Cathy. It's morning and she's going to 
school. She sits at her desk all day listening to her teacher. Loo , here 
comes David. He has some gum. David puts the gum in the red dra\\er 
and then he leaves. Look, here comes Cathy. She's coming home irom 
school. Cathy wants some gum. She looks for the gum in the green 
drawer. 
Visual, change of location: Here's Richard. He has a toy car. Rich-
ard puts his toy car in the blue jar. ow, Richard is going to school. He 
sits at his desk all day listening to his teachers. Look, here comes Susan. 
Susan moves the car to the black jar and then she leaves. Look, here 
comes Richard. He's coming home from school. Richard wants his car. 
He looks for the car in the blue jar. 
Auditory, single location: Here's Betty. She's listening to music on 
her headphones. It's very loud. Look, here comes Sam. He ha ~ome 
candy. Sam puts the candy in the green drawer, and savs, " Betty, I put 
the candy in the green drawer." Then Sam leaves. Later, Betty wants 
some candy. She looks for the cookies in the yellov: drawer. 
Auditory, change of location: Here's Tom. He has a to\ cat. Tom 
puts his toy cat behind the black door. ow he sits down and hsten to 
music on his headphones. It's very loud. Look, here comes Sarah. Sarah 
moves the cat to behind the red door and says, "Tom, I put the cat 
behind the red door." Then Sarah leaves. Tom's all done li tening to his 
music. Tom wants his cat. He looks for the cat behind the blac'· door. 
Cognitive access stories 
Delayed search, single location: Here's Debbie. She ha a ball. 
Debbie puts her ball in the blue drawer. ow Debbie s :'o,ng to chool. 
She sits at her desk all day listening to her teachers. 'ow chool j- o ·er 
and Debbie is coming home from school. Debbie wants the ball. She 
looks for the ball in the red drawer. 
Delayed search, change of location: Here's Carl. He has a to • dog. 
Carl puts the dog in the white bowl. Now, Carl moves the dog o the 
green bowl. ow Carl is going to school. He sit at hi: des · all day 
listening to his teachers. Now school is over and Carl i coming home 
from school. Carl wants the toy dog. He looks for the dog in the \'hite 
bowl. 
Attentional focus, single location: Here's Peter. Peter j· pia, .,~., a 
video game that he really loves to play. Look, here comes Sharo . ~e 
has some Legos. Sharon puts the Legos in the red box and sa,-, ·r~ •..:' 
put the Legos 1n the red box." Then Sharon leave .• 'o v Peter i done 
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playing his video game and he wants the Legos. Peter looks for the Legos 
in the brown box. 
Attentional focus, change of location: Here's Mary. She has a hat. 
Mary puts the hat in the white box. Now Mary is going to play a video 
game that she really loves to play. Look, here comes Steve. Steve moves 
the hat to the blue box and says, "Mary, I put the hat in the blue box." 
Then Steve leaves. Now Mary is done playing her video game and she 
wants the hat. Mary looks for the hat in the white box. 
